George Blackburne and Compatibilist Emergence for Consciousness
George Blackburne and colleagues propose compatibilist emergence as a way to understand the relation between subjectivity and its substrate. Their abstract treats the relevant emergence as necessary but not sufficient for consciousness. It suggests that life’s autopoietic character may require and promote that emergence. These are proposals about conditions for experience, rather than findings that a particular system is conscious.
Compatibilist emergence for the science of consciousness is an Open Peer Commentary in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 49, e321. Cambridge published it online on 17 September 2026. Its authors are George Blackburne, Alberto Liardi, Jeremy I. Skipper, Pedro A. M. Mediano, and Fernando E. Rosas. It belongs to the commentary exchange on Anil Seth’s biological naturalism target article.
We verified the publisher’s abstract, article type, author list, and publication details. We did not obtain the full commentary. The account below stays within the abstract. The editorial analysis is separate from the authors’ claims.
What the compatibilist emergence abstract proposes
The commentary abstract connects compatibilist emergence to the different ways nature can support new dynamical laws at higher scales. It then suggests that the autopoietic character of life may require and promote the kind of emergence necessary for consciousness. Autopoiesis refers to self-production, a concept Seth discusses in section 4.1 of his original target manuscript.
The word “may” qualifies both requiring and promoting this emergence. The abstract does not establish that every living system has the relevant dynamics. Nor does it say that autopoiesis is a sufficient condition for consciousness. Its explicit qualification is that the relevant kind of emergence is “necessary, albeit not sufficient”.
| Abstract statement | What can be reported | What remains open |
|---|---|---|
| Nature can support new dynamical laws at higher scales | The authors use this to frame the relation between subjectivity and substrate | The full definition and criteria for identifying these laws |
| Autopoiesis may require and promote the relevant emergence | The link to life is proposed conditionally | Whether the link holds in any particular system |
| This emergence is necessary but not sufficient for consciousness | The proposed condition alone would not establish consciousness | Which additional conditions are needed |
Cambridge classifies e321 as commentary. It is not a target article awaiting its own set of responses. The available material also does not establish separate conceptual or experimental contributions by individual co-authors.
Editorial analysis of emergence and measurement
A necessary condition can help exclude candidates without being enough to confirm them. If the proposal is correct, a system lacking the specified emergence could not be conscious. A system possessing it would still need to meet whatever additional conditions consciousness requires. That asymmetry prevents a measurement of emergence from becoming a consciousness verdict by itself.
This distinction connects two existing areas of coverage. Pedro Mediano’s Integrated Information Decomposition concerns the kinds of information present in joint dynamics. Erik Hoel’s causal emergence work concerns descriptions across scales. These provide different starting points for asking what a measurement represents. Neither the shared vocabulary nor a citation in e321 establishes that their measures are interchangeable with compatibilist emergence.
An assessment would need two separate justifications. First, it would need to show that a chosen measurement identifies the kind of emergence the authors mean. Second, it would need independent grounds for relating that property to experience. A system can satisfy a mathematical definition while the proposed link to consciousness remains uncertain.
Editorial analysis of the substrate question
Seth’s original manuscript and September response abstract ask how much consciousness depends on physical implementation. The commentary abstract asks how subjectivity relates to higher scale dynamics and life’s self-producing character. Their shared interest in physical processes does not establish agreement about digital consciousness.
A useful comparison would hold a specified higher scale property constant while changing the physical system that supports it. A claim of substrate independence would need to explain which properties must remain constant. A claim of biological necessity would need to explain why another substrate cannot support them. These are our proposed requirements for evaluating the debate, rather than experiments reported in e321.
The abstract leaves both requirements unresolved. It does not identify a silicon implementation, show that digital simulation is sufficient, or demonstrate that biological chemistry is uniquely necessary. The conditional link to autopoiesis cannot decide those questions alone.
The remaining conditions for consciousness
Compatibilist emergence gives this discussion a named proposal with an explicit limit on sufficiency. The full commentary is needed to assess its definitions, supporting arguments, and treatment of alternative substrates. We cannot infer those details from its references or its authors’ other work.
The proposal belongs alongside the alternatives in the consciousness theory index and the 2026 overview of AI consciousness research. Its abstract supports a question about what experience requires. It supplies no finding that life, emergence, or any artificial architecture is sufficient for consciousness.
Sources
- George Blackburne, Alberto Liardi, Jeremy I. Skipper, Pedro A. M. Mediano, and Fernando E. Rosas. Compatibilist emergence for the science of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 49, e321, Open Peer Commentary, published online 17 September 2026. DOI and publisher abstract. This account uses the abstract and publication details only.
- Anil K. Seth. Conscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, accepted manuscript, published online 21 April 2025. Cambridge manuscript and PDF. Section 4.1 discusses autopoiesis as self-production.
Researchers covered here
- Pedro MedianoImperial College London and the University of CambridgeIntegrated Information Decomposition, and the revised non-negative measure of integrated information
- George BlackburneUniversity College London and Imperial College LondonFirst author of the BBS commentary on compatibilist emergence
- Alberto LiardiImperial College LondonCo-author of the BBS commentary on compatibilist emergence
- Jeremy I. SkipperUniversity College LondonCo-author of the BBS commentary on compatibilist emergence
- Fernando E. RosasUniversity of Sussex, Imperial College London, University of Oxford, and PIBBSSCorresponding author of the BBS commentary on compatibilist emergence