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Gualtiero Piccinini

University of Missouri, St. Louis

Biological naturalist Consciousness requires living metabolic hardware

Gualtiero Piccinini is a philosopher of science at the University of Missouri, St. Louis, and the leading defender of the mechanistic account of computation. His 2010 paper The Mind as Neural Software? in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research took apart the assumption that minds relate to brains the way programs relate to computers, and his 2020 book Neurocognitive Mechanisms: Explaining Biological Cognition (Oxford University Press) rebuilt cognitive explanation on mechanisms instead.

His position has two connected parts. First, computation is not free-floating software. A computing system is a mechanism whose components perform organized activities, so a digital model of a brain is a different mechanism that represents the original, rather than the same mind on new hardware. Second, phenomenal consciousness depends on the specific neurobiophysical properties of neural tissue, the electrochemical dynamics, ion channel kinetics and physical processes that functional descriptions abstract away. His 2021 chapter The Myth of Mind Uploading states the consequence for mind uploading, and his 2026 Behavioral and Brain Sciences commentary on Anil Seth sharpens it into the neurobiophysical substrate argument.

This site covers the argument arc in the Piccinini mechanist case post and the later substrate statement in the Piccinini substrate argument post. His position is the most disciplined version of the claim this site must answer, that substrate independence for consciousness is an assumption that needs evidence rather than a starting point.

Known for. The mechanistic account of computation, Neurocognitive Mechanisms, The Myth of Mind Uploading, the neurobiophysical substrate argument

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