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Critic and Skeptic Researchers on AI Consciousness

Critics and skeptics argue that the evidence and the methods available today do not support strong claims in either direction about AI consciousness. Ned Block’s 1995 distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness gives other critics in this group their main tool, showing that a system passing behavioural tests has demonstrated access to information without necessarily any accompanying experience. Eric Schwitzgebel’s ten feature checklist and weirdness argument catalogue the specific ways a genuinely alien mind could satisfy or fail human intuitions about consciousness for reasons that have nothing to do with whether it is conscious. Susan Schneider’s Artificial Consciousness Tests turn this skepticism into a concrete experimental protocol rather than leaving it as a general stance. Patricia Churchland’s eliminative materialism goes further, treating much of the everyday vocabulary used to frame the debate as owed for replacement once neuroscience matures.

Across this group, the position withholds a verdict on current AI systems rather than issuing one, on the grounds that the evidence available does not support a verdict either way. For where the evidence currently stands, see the current scientific consensus on AI consciousness; for the full researcher directory, see all consciousness researchers.