Fork the consciousness, or download the project and create your own.

Tom McClelland

University of Cambridge

Critic Current evidence and current methods do not support the claims being made

Tom McClelland is a philosopher at the University of Cambridge working on the epistemology of AI consciousness and the foundations of AI welfare. His central position, set out in “Agnosticism About Artificial Consciousness” and developed in subsequent papers, is that the evidence does not currently warrant either affirmation or denial of machine consciousness, and that respect for evidentialism forces an agnostic stance.

In “How to Navigate Uncertainty About AI Consciousness,” an AISB 2026 symposium paper, McClelland argues that the field should shift from the consciousness question to the valence question. Whether an AI has states that would constitute valenced experiences if it were conscious is more tractable than whether it is conscious, and it is sufficient to ground responsible treatment under uncertainty.

McClelland’s epistemic position on AI consciousness is frequently cited by this site as the rigorous statement of the middle ground between biological skepticism and functionalist affirmation, and his valence framework is a foundational reference for the AI welfare research program.

Known for. Evidentialist agnosticism about AI consciousness, epistemics of machine minds, AI valence and welfare methodology

Coverage on this site

Related researchers