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Thomas Nagel

Thomas Nagel

New York University

Biological naturalist Consciousness requires living metabolic hardware

Thomas Nagel Photograph by Nagelt, CC BY-SA 4.0.

Thomas Nagel gave contemporary philosophy of mind its defining criterion of phenomenal consciousness. In his seminal 1974 paper “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (The Philosophical Review, DOI: 10.2307/2183914), he argued that an organism is conscious if and only if there is “something that it is like” to be that organism, an irreducible subjective, first-person character of experience.

Nagel’s position challenges purely objective, third-person physicalist and functionalist accounts. Because human sensory experience is grounded in vision and hearing, humans cannot comprehend the subjective point of view of a bat’s echolocation system, even with a complete physical description of its neurophysiology.

In Mind and Cosmos (Oxford University Press, 2012, ISBN 978-0-19-991975-8), Nagel extended this critique to evolutionary materialist reductionism, arguing that a complete scientific understanding of nature must account for consciousness as a fundamental feature of reality rather than an accidental byproduct of physical complexity.

Known for. What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (1974), the subjective character of experience, and Mind and Cosmos (2012)

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