David Chalmers
New York University. Co-director, Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness
Functionalist What matters is the organisation of the processing, not the material
Position on AI consciousness
Chalmers holds that consciousness is not obviously tied to biology and that a system with the right organisation could be conscious. He puts current language models at probably not conscious, while arguing that the reasons for confidence are weaker than people assume.
David Chalmers gave the field its central problem and its vocabulary. The hard problem is the question of why physical processing is accompanied by experience at all, as distinct from the easy problems of explaining discrimination, integration, reportability and control. Those easy problems are hard in the ordinary sense and will yield to normal science. The hard one is different in kind, because a complete functional account leaves the question untouched.
His position on artificial systems follows from that and is more permissive than his reputation suggests. Chalmers holds that consciousness is not obviously tied to biology, that a system with the right organisation could be conscious, and that current language models probably are not but that the reasons for confidence are weaker than people assume. He has put explicit probabilities on it rather than asserting a verdict, which is unusual and useful.
The caution he urges is epistemic. We are poor judges of which systems are conscious, our intuitions were shaped by encountering only biological minds, and a system trained on human text is optimised to produce exactly the signals those intuitions respond to. That is a different worry from the claim that machines cannot be conscious, and the two are frequently conflated.
Known for. Naming the hard problem of consciousness, and the philosophical zombie argument
Coverage on this site
Research Papers and Preprints
- Dreaming and Consciousness From David Foulkes to World Models September 2026
- David Chalmers and Andy Han Find Reinforcement Learning Recruits a Functional Welfare Axis in Language Models September 2026
- David Chalmers Moral Weight and the Probability of LLM Sentience in 2026 August 2026
- Anil Seth Mythology of Conscious AI Biological Naturalism Berggruen Prize Essay August 2026
- Andy Clark's Predictive Processing Framework and What It Actually Implies for LLMs July 2026
- What AI Researchers Actually Believe About AI Subjective Experience July 2026
- The Zombie Gap in AI Consciousness Where 2026 Biological Naturalism Research Draws the Line June 2026
- Emergent Language as an Approach to Conscious AI and A Generative Methodology from Osaka June 2026
- Belief Formation and Meta-Cognitive Monitoring in LLMs and Empirical Support for the HOT-3 Consciousness Indicator June 2026
- Chalmers on LLMs Virtual Entities, Quasi-Agency, and the Question of AI Welfare May 2026
- Consciousness Indicators, Mimicry, and the Problem of Internal Variants May 2026
- The Calibration Problem Why AI Consciousness Indicators Need Biological Grounding May 2026
- Can We Validate AI Consciousness Indicators? The Hard Problem Behind the Checklist April 2026
- What Would AI Consciousness Actually Look Like? The 14-Indicator Checklist Explained March 2026
- Chalmers on Gradual Uploading and Why It Counts as Survival June 2025
- Organizational Invariance and the Fading Qualia Argument June 2025
Books and Monographs
- The Importance of Being Conscious. Lee and Pautz's OUP Volume on Moral Weight October 2026
- Two Books, One Argument and Stephen Hawley Martin's Case Against AI Consciousness April 2026
Keynotes and Event Talks
- UT Austin Consciousness and Intelligence 2026 Recap with Chalmers, Seth and Aaronson November 2026
- UT Austin Consciousness and Intelligence Symposium and SfN 2026 Neuroethics Preview October 2026
- ICCS 2025 What Chalmers, Frankish, and Blackmore Found to Disagree About in Heraklion May 2026
Articles and Commentary
- Pantheon Uploaded Intelligence and the Neuroscience of Mind Uploading October 2026
- From HAL 9000 to Chappie How Cinema Has Theorized AI Consciousness Across Six Decades March 2026
Related researchers
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Anil SethSussex Centre for Consciousness Science, University of SussexThe beast machine hypothesis, and controlled hallucination as an account of perception
- Scott AaronsonUniversity of Texas at Austin, Department of Computer ScienceQuantum complexity theory, mathematical counterexamples to Integrated Information Theory (Phi in expander graphs and Reed-Solomon grids), speaker at UT Austin Consciousness and Intelligence 2026
- Alison GopnikUniversity of California, Berkeley, Department of Psychology and Department of PhilosophyThe Scientist in the Crib, The Philosophical Baby, Bayesian causal learning in childhood, lantern consciousness vs spotlight consciousness, speaker at UT Austin Consciousness and Intelligence 2026
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Blaise Agüera y ArcasGoogle VP and Fellow, CTO of Technology & SocietyComputational functionalism, active inference, on-device neural computing, What Is Intelligence? (2025), and Who Are We Now? (2023)
- Gary LupyanDepartment of Psychology, University of Wisconsin-MadisonLabel-feedback hypothesis, language-augmented cognition, coining anendophasia with Johanne Nedergaard (2024)
- Winston ChiongUniversity of California, San Francisco, Memory and Aging Center and UCSF BioethicsClinical neuroethics of dementia, deep brain stimulation and agency, 2026 Society for Neuroscience David Kopf Lecture on Neuroethics ('What Can Neuroscience Reveal About Human Values?')
David Chalmers is listed with the other functionalists and computationalists, who hold that what matters is the organisation of the processing, not the material. The theory family behind that position is set out in the index of consciousness theories. Every researcher covered on this site is indexed in the directory of consciousness researchers.